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Introduction
EU Law, Sovereignty, and Populism

francesca bignami

Over the past decade, the European Union has been shaken to the core by the
rise of populist parties and movements. The watershed moment was the global
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, which, for Europe, quickly escalated into a sovereign
debt crisis. In southern debtor countries, populist left-wing parties have risen
to prominence on anti-austerity platforms. They have either been in government, as in the case of Greece’s Syriza party and Italy’s Five Star Movement,
or have come close to entering government, as with Spain’s Podemos party,
which won 21 percent of the vote in the 2015 parliamentary elections.
Although the economic crisis was not as dramatic in Eastern Europe, there
it has served as fodder for the rise of authoritarian populism, beginning with
Hungary, where Fidesz won a parliamentary supermajority in 2010.1 At
the same time, parties on the extreme right in Western Europe have mutated
from fringe to mainstream political players. Although not openly authoritarian, as some of their East European counterparts, they are both ethnonationalist and anti-immigrant. To take the most salient examples, in France,
the Front National’s candidate came second in the last presidential election;
in the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom became the second-largest party in
the last parliamentary elections; the Sweden Democrats won 17 percent of the
vote in the most recent elections; and, representing an extraordinary moment
for German postwar politics, in 2017 the Alternative für Deutschland entered
the Bundestag with over 12 percent of the vote. Perhaps the most striking, and
certainly the most consequential, example of the populist turn to date was the
British referendum of June 2016, in which the majority voted to leave the
European Union, and which has triggered the painful and protracted Brexit
process. The most recent test of strength for populist parties was the May
1

For purposes of brevity, the term “Eastern Europe” is used in this chapter to refer to the
countries in the former Eastern Bloc that joined the EU in 2004 and in later years.
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2019 vote for the 2019–2024 European Parliament. The results conﬁrmed the
decline of the mainstream parties of the left and the right and the growing
strength of newer forces across the political spectrum, including, but not
limited to, the extreme right.
The national parties and movements behind the populist turn are radically
different in many respects, but they all share a common hostility to the EU
political establishment. In Western Europe, these parties typically oppose the
political forces that have governed their countries throughout the postwar era
and that have generally been proponents of European integration. In Eastern
Europe, due to the volatile character of party systems, certain populist parties
such as Fidesz (in Hungary) and Law and Justice (in Poland) have had
signiﬁcant experience in government in recent years. In these cases, antiestablishment sentiment is directed almost entirely outwards, at mainstream
politics in Western Europe and at the EU level.
In populist discourse, the European Union is shorthand for a variety of
evils – from greedy bankers, to austerity-imposing technocrats, social
dumping, uncontrolled immigration, and enforced pluralism and multiculturalism.2 On the left, the EU is blamed for dismantling the welfare state
and undermining social rights through its management of the euro crisis. On
the right, the principal rallying cry is the ethnic and cultural identity of the
nation state. European integration is, by deﬁnition, a cosmopolitan political
project that seeks to overcome parochial nationalisms and it has proven an
easy target for right-wing populists. In particular, the ire of the right has been
fueled by EU policies aimed at promoting the migration of persons among the
Member States, as well as managing the migration of certain categories of
individuals from outside the EU.
As this string of complaints highlights, at the heart of the populist critique is
not simply an amorphous establishment, but a concrete set of EU laws and
policies. Populist leaders take aim at the elements of the EU agenda that go to
the heart of national sovereignty: economic policy, human migration, internal
security, and fundamental constitutional precepts connected with the rule of
law, rights, and democracy. These are all relatively new areas of EU governance linked to the EU’s switch in raison d’être in the Maastricht Treaty signed
in 1992. Until then, the EU had been primarily a market-making and marketregulating entity. In the Maastricht Treaty, the foundations of an ambitious
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Throughout this introductory chapter, and reﬂecting the nomenclature that has applied since
the Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in 2007 and entered into force in late 2009, the term
“European Union” is used to refer to the political entity that was previously named the
European Economic Community and, later, the European Community.
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political union were laid down. The Member States committed to economic
and monetary union (EMU) and cooperation on justice and home affairs
(now renamed the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice or AFSJ), which
refers to border control, immigration from third countries, and law enforcement and criminal justice.3 These AFSJ competences were added to an
already substantial body of law facilitating the intra-European migration of
Member State nationals for economic purposes, known as the law of free
movement of persons. The preamble to the Maastricht Treaty also prominently stated the common attachment of all the signatory states in their own
constitutional law to the “principles of liberty, democracy and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law.” In the years
since Maastricht, cooperation on EMU, AFSJ, and free movement of persons
has been extensive, and there have also been efforts to improve human rights
and rule-of-law monitoring. As a result, the EU has come to exercise authority
over core areas of state sovereignty. The classic economic, territorial control,
security, and constitutional functions of the nation state are performed today
not by Member States alone, but in conjunction with the EU.
This book affords a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the sovereigntysensitive areas of EU law that have become extraordinarily salient with the
populist surge and that have taken on extreme urgency for the future of
Europe – economic policy; human migration, deﬁned in this book as both
intra-European migration and third-country immigration (economic immigration and asylum seekers), as well as border control of the EU external border;
internal security, which refers to both police and judicial cooperation; and
constitutional fundamentals, a long list of values, but which can be boiled
down to the rule of law, rights, and democracy. With the growing importance
and politicization of these areas of EU governance, it has become critical to
understand their basic legal contours, their fundamental challenges, and their
future prospects. The contributors to this volume, all recognized authorities in
their respective subﬁelds, provide a state-of-the-art account of the law, debates,
and future reform possibilities in each of these hot-button areas. At the same
time, the authors employ a variety of theoretical frameworks, drawn from both
the law and political science, to illuminate and assess the current trajectories
of EU law.
By providing a cross-cutting perspective on the subjects, this volume ﬁlls an
important gap in the legal literature, both didactic and scholarly. Didactic
3

The Maastricht Treaty also included cooperation on foreign and defense policy, called the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, but this continues to be the least developed area of
European integration and is not taken up in this volume.
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efforts at the systematic exposition of EU law continue to focus on the single
market as the substantive core of the ﬁeld and to treat economic policy,
human migration, internal security, and constitutional fundamentals as peripheral, and unrelated, topics.4 Although this approach is faithful to the
historical development of European integration, it is out of touch with the
current realities of EU law and politics. Today, with the exception of intelligence agencies, defense, and foreign policy, EU law squarely occupies every
sovereignty-sensitive area of public policymaking and this book provides an
essential guide to that law. In doing so, it equips the reader with the basic
knowledge necessary to engage in the highly charged debates that have swept
European politics. The claims thrown around about the EU and its law
contain a mixture of truth, over-simpliﬁcation, and falsehood. This book lays
the groundwork for a more level-headed understanding of how the EU
intervenes in core areas of state sovereignty.
From a scholarly perspective, by affording a cross-cutting look at what are
generally siloed areas of legal scholarship, this volume creates important
theoretical and normative opportunities. It serves as the basis for drawing out
analytical frames and theoretical dynamics that can improve our understanding of EU law and inform the future development of the law.5 In these areas,
the EU exerts legal authority over issues that are central to the symbolic
politics, the organizational and policy backbone, and the public law of the
nation state. Because of the national sensitivities of economic policy, human
migration, internal security, and constitutional fundamentals, the EU’s legal
authority was not announced in a grand act of political union, but rather has
accrued piecemeal through spillover – inter-state cooperation on relatively
low-hanging fruit has expanded to cooperation in more controversial policy
areas. In the concluding chapter of this volume, I argue that there are three
critical implications of these shared roots that have not been adequately

4
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See, e.g., Roger J. Goebel et al., Cases and Materials on European Law, 4th ed. (Saint Paul,
MN: West Academic Publishing, 2015); Anthony Arnull, European Union Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017); Stephen Weatherill, Cases & Materials on EU Law, 12th ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
The proposition that a cross-cutting analysis of EU governance outside the single market
domain can lead to fruitful theoretical insights has been explored in political science, see
Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs, eds., Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European
Integration of Core State Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) and Gerda Falkner,
ed., EU Policies in Times of Crisis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). Legal scholarship so far has
examined the far-ranging legal and constitutional consequences of the euro crisis, e.g., Damian
Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs, and Christian Joerges, eds., The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream:
Adjusting to European Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), but has not
included developments in other areas of sovereignty-sensitive EU law in the analysis.
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appreciated in the subject-speciﬁc legal scholarship – implications for the
quality of law, the protection of rights, and the operation of democracy.
The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. The next section
explains the historical spillover trajectory through which EU law has come to
occupy sovereignty-sensitive areas and thus serve as fodder for populist parties
and political movements. I then preview the individual chapters by subject
area, focusing on the unique theoretical and analytical contribution of each.
Last, I sketch the cross-cutting legal challenges and reform proposals that are
set out in depth in my concluding chapter to this book.

i spillover into economic policy, human migration,
internal security, and constitutional fundamentals
How has the EU been catapulted from a free trade organization to a quasifederal entity with power over economic policy, the territorial belonging and
safety of people, and the essential aspects of liberal democratic political
morality? The answer is spillover. That is, the Member States have pooled
sovereignty in relatively well-delimited areas that beneﬁt from a high degree of
consensus and then, based on the experience with such cooperation, have
proceeded to share sovereignty in other, related areas. This logic, associated
with the positive and normative theory of neo-functionalism, was originally
conceived as a process of gradually expanding supranational governance by
jumping from one successful cooperative endeavor to another to maximize
the common gains to be had from European integration.6 In many respects,
the gradual expansion of free movement of persons in the 1980s and 1990s
can be said to have followed this trajectory. In the past decade or so, the
political incentives underpinning spillover have been cast more in the

6

Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (London: Third Millennium Publishing, 2015),
300, 393–394 (ﬁrst published in Great Britain in 1978 by William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd);
Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), xxxi–xxxvii.
Although spillover is associated with the broader theory of neo-functionalism, this discussion is
not meant to take sides in the long-running debate between neo-functionalists and
intergovernmentalists in political science. See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks,
“A Postfunctionalist Theory: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British
Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 3–5. The concept of spillover is used only to
capture the sequencing of the policies that have come to occupy the EU agenda, and not to
address the question of which actors (national governments or supranational institutions) and
interest groups (national or transnational) are responsible for putting those policies on the EU
agenda.
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negative vein – new policy prerogatives being necessary to stave off disaster.7
The prime example of this negative logic is the euro crisis and the leap from
monetary union to economic and ﬁscal policy. Regardless of the precise
nature of the incentives, the undeniable centrality of spillover to European
integration has come with the absence of a grand plan for a federal union.
What has generally come ﬁrst for nation states has come piece-by-piece and
last, if at all, for the European Union.

1 Economic Policy
To turn to the spillover speciﬁcs: As hinted previously, in the case of economic
policy, it was tight cooperation on monetary policy that gave rise to economic
interdependence and intense pressure to integrate ﬁscal and budgetary matters
during the euro crisis. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the goal of monetary
union and a single currency, and the process was completed on January 1,
2002, when the euro entered into circulation in the twelve original members
of the Eurozone.8 To the extent that there was a Eurozone economic policy it
was ﬁscal discipline, to be imposed by legal rules and ﬁnancial markets. To
avoid inﬂationary pressures and promote the overall economic stability of the
Eurozone, Member States signed up to the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997,
which set a 3 percent GDP limit for budget deﬁcits and a 60 percent GDP
limit for state debt. There were so-called preventive and corrective arms,
designed to ensure that Member States complied with the budgetary limits.
At the same time, there was the Treaty “no-bail out clause,” which prohibited
the assumption of national debt by either the EU or the Member States and
therefore made debtor countries reliant on markets to ﬁnance their budgets –
and hence, the theory went, subject to the discipline of ﬁnancial-market
demand for their debt.
As was obvious to anyone who witnessed the unfolding of events after 2008,
ﬁscal discipline as the EU’s lone economic policy tool failed miserably.9 After
the euro was introduced, ﬁnancial markets for sovereign debt failed to price in
different risk premiums for countries with different debt prospects and economic outlooks – say, Germany and Italy. Moreover, as demonstrated by the
7
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Erik Jones, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Sophie Meunier, “Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and
the Incomplete Nature of European Integration,” Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 7
(2016): 1010–1034.
For a brief overview of this early EMU history, see Chapter 2 and literature cited therein.
For description and analysis of the euro crisis from a political economy perspective, see
Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, eds., The Future of the Euro (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015).
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failed effort to enforce the deﬁcit limit against France and Germany in 2004, it
was politically impossible to enforce the EU rules limiting budget spending.
When the global ﬁnancial crisis hit in 2008, the EU was woefully unprepared.
First came the banking crisis. Particularly hard-hit were smaller economies
such as Ireland that had experienced large inﬂows of private capital during the
heady ﬁrst days of monetary union. Then, by 2010, the banking crisis had
escalated into a sovereign debt crisis, as countries were forced to underwrite
their banks’ debts and as their own access to credit dried up. Propelled by the
fear of contagion and ﬁnancial and economic collapse – and as many have
noted, solicitous of the economic interests of the French and German banks
that were some of the biggest lenders in the crisis-hit countries – Eurozone
leaders acted in ﬁts and starts to prop up the system.
The end result is a radically transformed EMU that contains both a more
robust economic dimension and a more interventionist monetary policy. The
European Central Bank (ECB) has assumed an increasingly important role in
crisis prevention and management.10 To avoid a recurrence of the ﬁnancial
crisis, there is now centralized ECB licensing and supervision of large banks
(Single Supervisory Mechanism) and a mechanism for winding up failing
banks, including an EU fund to compensate partially the shareholders and
creditors of failed banks (Single Resolution Mechanism). Moreover, during
and after the euro crisis, the ECB intervened with economic stimulus through
a massive quantitative easing program involving the purchase of sovereign
debt and other types of securities on secondary markets.
Beyond the ﬁnancial markets dimension, there is also now a more extensive
EU economic policy.11 This is the change that has generated the most political
controversy and has been responsible for fueling many strands of populist
discontent – both in southern debtor countries, where anti-establishment
parties have accused EU-imposed austerity of dismantling the public sector
and welfare programs, and in northern creditor states, where parties on the
center-right, including populist ones, have resisted ﬁscal transfers to sinking
southern economies.12 There now is a permanent organization, the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), with the capacity to undertake large-scale ﬁscal
transfers to Eurozone states in grave ﬁnancial difﬁculty. These transfers are
structured as loans subject to strict conditionality. Although program
10

11

12

On EU banking and economic law, see Antonio Estella, Legal Foundations of EU Economic
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
On all of what follows in this section and for extensive citations to the scholarly literature, see
the contributions in Part I of this volume.
See Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, eds., European Populism in the Shadow of the Great
Recession (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016).
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countries, i.e. those receiving ESM loans, are subject to particularly tight
constraints on their public spending, all Eurozone countries now take part
in a heightened system of economic surveillance and sanctioning. The Fiscal
Compact requires that the signatory countries adhere to a balanced budget
rule and introduce mechanisms domestically to enforce the rule. EU legislation known as the Six Pack and the Two Pack has put into place an elaborate
monitoring system: Each year, as part of the European Semester, all Member
States submit their economic and budgetary plans for review by the European
Commission (and Council); in addition, Eurozone countries submit their
draft annual budgets before those budgets can be voted on by their national
parliaments. There is surveillance for budget deﬁcits in excess of the target
imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure) and
for macroeconomic imbalances (Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure),
which comprise a broad range of macroeconomic indicators linked to economic stability. Eurozone Member States that breach these targets and indicators can be required to put down deposits or pay ﬁnes or their payments
from the European Structural and Investment Funds can be suspended.13

2 Human Migration
Turning to human migration, the spillover story begins with the renewed
impetus for market integration in the Single European Act of 1986. That treaty
contained an important provision declaring that “[t]he internal market shall
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, services, persons and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.”14 The commitment to remove borders for persons soon
ran into political difﬁculty because logically speaking the freedom to travel
without having to stop at the border and produce papers would have to extend
to all individuals crossing national borders, not only to persons with the right
to move to seek employment or engage in other forms of economic activity
under the existing law on free movement of persons.15 Although this law has
been in considerable ﬂux over the past decades, it was the case in 1986, and it
13

14
15

The Structural and Investment Funds represent the largest part of the EU budget and are
directed at the agricultural and ﬁshing industries and promoting territorial cohesion by funding
projects in less prosperous regions. See European Commission, European Structural and
Investment Funds 2014–2020: Ofﬁcial Texts and Commentaries (Luxembourg: Publications
Ofﬁce of the European Union, 2015).
Article 8a Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.
On this early history of the Schengen Convention and Justice and Home Affairs, see Steve
Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Harlow: Longman, 1999), 63–76.
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still is, that the travel and residence rights that are conferred under the law of
free movement of persons are tethered to the activity of an economically active
person who is a citizen of one Member State and moves to another Member
State, either alone or with the rest of the family unit.16 The person moving
must generally be a citizen of another Member State and must move for a
bona ﬁde economic reason – in the case of travel for short periods, receiving
services such as those connected with the tourist or healthcare industries, and
in the case of longer periods of residence, participating in the labor market or
attending an educational establishment. The Single European Act’s market
“without internal frontiers” would facilitate the movement not only of individuals with rights under the existing free movement law, but also everyone
else – most notably third-country nationals and individuals engaged in criminal activity.
In light of the ramiﬁcations of the removal of border controls, the Member
States divided early on into two groups – the skeptics, comprising the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, and the integrationists, comprising the
original core of continental Member States. Because of these and other
divisions, a subset of Member States moved forward with the project under
international law and outside the EU framework, with the Schengen
Agreement in 1985 and then the Schengen Convention in 1990. The Schengen Convention, which came into force in 1993 in seven Member States but
was only applied in 1995, removed border checks among the participating
Member States and created a single, common external border around the socalled Schengen Area. At the same time, as hinted previously, it was widely
recognized that this policy would not only facilitate intra-European migration
of EU nationals but would also have spillover effects for the movement of
third-country nationals. Therefore, the removal of border controls was accompanied by cooperation on immigration, asylum, and visa policy (collectively
referred to here as the immigration aspects of human migration).17 The
centerpiece of so-called Schengen ﬂanking measures was, and continues to
be, the Schengen Information System (SIS), a centralized database of information on undesirable persons.18 Especially in the early years, the SIS was

16

17

18

For a general discussion of the law of free movement of persons through the Treaty of Lisbon,
see Koen Lenaerts, Piet Van Nuffel, and Robert Bray, Constitutional Law of the European
Union, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).
Because of the focus of this volume, this chapter does not address cooperation on civil matters
such as contracts enforcement, which is historically connected to cooperation on immigration
and law enforcement and in many texts is discussed in conjunction with the latter two policies.
See generally Chapter 9 and the literature cited therein. The original SIS has been replaced by
a second-generation database called SIS II, but the basic contours remain the same.
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dominated by entries on third-country nationals who were to be refused entry
or stay in the Schengen Area. In parallel, there was cooperation on asylum
policy through a separate international agreement – the Dublin Convention,
which was signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1997.19 This was designed
to address the problem of “refugees in orbit,” namely the prospect that no
Schengen Area country would take responsibility for examining a particular
asylum claim, and the problem of using the borderless travel area to ﬁle
asylum claims in multiple jurisdictions.
Although spillover from borders to immigration has not been entirely even
across the speciﬁc issue areas, cooperation today is robust. This is reﬂected in
both the formal and the substantive dimensions of EU policymaking. Since
the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in
1999, the authority to make and implement policy on border controls and
immigration are squarely EU competences under what is now called the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Moreover, there
has been signiﬁcant EU output in most of the issue areas, with the notable
exception of long-term economic immigration.20 There is extensive law and
administrative policy on managing the common external border; on visa
policy, i.e. whether and under what conditions third-country nationals must
obtain a visa to come into the Schengen Area for short stays of three months or
less, as well as the requirements for entry and exit of citizens of visa-free
countries; and on asylum seekers and the system for processing individuals
who qualify for refugee protection under international law.
Parallel to the development of the Schengen Area was the emergence of an
increasingly robust law of free movement of persons.21 In the 1970s and early
1980s most of the impetus came from the European Court of Justice, which
issued a string of important judgments on the rights of workers, their family
members, and students under the Treaty and secondary legislation. By 1990,
however, the legislative branch had begun to take the lead, with a series of
measures that extended certain free movement rights to non-economically active

19
20

21

See generally Chapter 8.
See generally Steve Peers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law, vol. I of EU Justice and Home
Affairs Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); for a comprehensive overview of
developments since 2009, see Chapter 14.
For a brief overview of this historical trajectory, see Chapter 7. See also Dimitry Kochenov and
Richard Plender, “EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The
Discovery of the Treaty Text,” European Law Review 37, no. 4 (2012): 369–396; Dimitry Kochenov,
ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2017); Martijn van den Brink, “EU Citizenship and (Fundamental) Rights: Empirical, Normative,
and Conceptual Problems,” European Law Journal 25, no. 1 (2019): 21–36.
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persons. Then, in the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States introduced the status
of EU citizenship. Although the rights conferred by EU citizenship were notoriously ambiguous, supranational citizenship in conjunction with the existing
market freedoms combined to expand the free movement rights of Member
State nationals. The adoption of the Citizenship Directive in 2004,22 which
codiﬁed much of the Court of Justice’s case law and which coincided with East
European accession, set the stage for the current era of intra-EU migration.
The remarkable internal migration that has resulted from the law of free
movement of persons, in combination with the Schengen system, has been a
source of political backlash in the Member States. Right-wing populist parties
have drawn much of their strength from the fear of migration within the
Schengen Area and the perceived threat to economic well-being and, even
more so, to national and ethnic identity.23 The campaigning on the Brexit
referendum illustrates vividly the variety of anxieties that human migration has
triggered.24 On the one hand, the ﬁnger was pointed at low-skill workers from
Member States in Eastern Europe who were accused of dragging down
working conditions and wage levels and undermining British national identity. On the other hand, even though the United Kingdom never joined the
Schengen Area and therefore was never at risk of so-called secondary movements of refugees from frontline countries like Greece and Italy to other
Schengen states, images of Syrian refugees lining up at the Hungarian and
Austrian borders went viral during the Brexit campaign. The not-so-subtle
message was that the United Kingdom risked being overwhelmed by people
from the Middle East belonging to an entirely different ethnic, racial, cultural,
and religious tradition. Strands of this economic and identitarian political
rhetoric can be found in virtually every Member State.

3 Internal Security
As mentioned in the last section, the removal of internal border controls and
the creation of the Schengen Area raised the prospect of both illegitimate
22
23

24

European Parliament and Council, Directive 2004/58/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 229) 35.
Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration,” 13; Liesbet Hooghe
and Gary Marks, “Re-engaging Grand Theory: European Integration in the 21st Century,” EUI
Working Papers, RSCAS 2018/43, 2018, 9–12.
See Simon Deakin, “Brexit, Labour Rights and Migration: Why Wisbech Matters to Brussels,”
German Law Journal, Brexit Supplement 17 (2016): 13–20; Jonathan Faull, “European Law in
the United Kingdom,” European Law Review 43, no. 5 (2018): 785–786; Neil Nugent, “Brexit:
Yet Another Crisis for the EU,” in Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe, eds.
Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger (London: UCL Press, 2018), 59.
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migration by third-country nationals and the exploitation of border-free travel
by criminal actors, to avoid detection by their national police authorities.
Therefore, the Schengen Convention also contained a law enforcement
component. Most importantly, the Schengen Information System (SIS)
included data on individuals wanted for arrest and extradition, witnesses or
persons summoned by judicial authorities, and objects such as stolen vehicles
connected to police investigations and criminal proceedings. The SIS was
designed to be accessed not only by national border control ofﬁcers and
immigration ofﬁcials but also by police and customs enforcement authorities
when investigating individuals on their national territory or at their external
borders.
Spillover from borders to policing and criminal justice, what this book
refers to collectively as internal security policy, has developed more slowly
than immigration policy.25 Although internal security was included in the
Maastricht Treaty, it remained in the Treaty on European Union for almost
two decades. (The Treaty on European Union [TEU] is the Treaty that,
together with the TFEU, comprises the legal foundation of the EU and that
historically was more intergovernmental and less supranational than the
TFEU.26) In the Lisbon Treaty, however, competences for internal security
were transferred to the TFEU. This change included qualiﬁed majority voting
in the Council for most types of internal security measures, which has
accelerated considerably the policy output in the domain. The result today
is a fairly developed body of EU law that covers everything from the early
stages of police investigations up through criminal prosecution and
conviction.

25
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See generally Steve Peers, EU Criminal Law, Policing, and Civil Law, vol. II of EU Justice and
Home Affairs Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); for a comprehensive
overview of developments since 2009, see Chapter 14.
The distinction between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism appears at a number of
points in this introductory chapter and the rest of the volume. For most purposes, the
distinguishing characteristic concerns the institutions and processes through which decisions
are to be made and enforced. In the supranational, “Community method” the European
Commission, European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice are fully empowered,
and Member State voting in the Council is by qualiﬁed majority. In intergovernmentalism,
most of the power rests with the Member States, with no or little role for the other institutions,
and the voting rule is unanimity. Historically, the procedures contained in the TEU were of
the intergovernmental variety, while those in the predecessor treaties to the TFEU were of the
supranational variety. The situation has changed since the Lisbon Treaty, since the TEU was
revamped to incorporate the EU’s constitutional and institutional framework. Still today,
however, policy areas over which the Member States seek to retain control, most notably the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, remain in the TEU.
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The connection between internal security policy and populism is less direct
than with respect to economic policy and human migration and, if anything,
operates in the inverse sense. In certain populist discourse, human migration
in the Schengen Area has been linked to terrorism, serious crime, and other
types of social disorder. The threat to economic well-being and national
identity from the inﬂux of foreign nationals is coupled with the perception
of risk to physical safety and public order. In political rhetoric, the association
between violence and the loss of control over borders is particularly evident
with respect to terrorist acts by Islamic extremists; however, it also extends to
less dramatic forms of criminal violence and to other types of immigrant
populations. In limited respects, the EU’s growing body of internal security
law and policy can be said to be directed at these fears. The Schengen system
has been implicated in certain highly visible security failures such as the Paris
terrorist attack of fall 2015, involving Islamic extremists that moved between
Belgium and France,27 and European policymakers have sought to improve
counter-terrorism coordination among the Member States.28 The law enforcement aspects of the numerous EU databases on third-country nationals have
been enhanced, playing to the characterization of third-country nationals as
potential threats to physical safety and public order.29 Overall, however, there
is strong continuity between the original purposes of Schengen ﬂanking
measures and the evolution of EU law and policy in the internal security
domain. The Schengen Area of borderless travel and Europe’s increasingly
integrated social space have created signiﬁcant challenges for police and
judicial authorities, still organized along national lines, and therefore policymakers have sought to enhance the tools available to these authorities in
pursuing cross-border criminal activity.

4 Constitutional Fundamentals
In the case of constitutional fundamentals, the spillover trajectory is still in its
incipiency. In the aftermath of World War Two, European cooperation split
into two different international systems: the Council of Europe, headquartered in Strasbourg, was dedicated to fundamental rights and democracy; the
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See, e.g., Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par
l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015, Rapport No. 3922, Assemblé
nationale, Quatorzième Législature (July 5, 2016).
See Chapters 10 and 11.
See Chapter 9.
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European Economic Community, headquartered in Brussels, had responsibility for markets.30 Over time, this division of labor has broken down. Most
notably, since the 1960s, the European Court of Justice has developed a
jurisprudence of rights and values under the rubric of principes généraux du
droit, applicable to the EU’s own institutions and scheme of government; with
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in
2000 and ofﬁcially adopted in 2009, the EU also acquired a formal catalogue
of rights.31 Still today, however, the Member States are reluctant to cede
control over their internal democratic and human rights practices to EU
scrutiny. Compared to the Council of Europe system, the EU is signiﬁcantly
more powerful and therefore giving it full-ﬂedged prerogatives would represent a far greater loss of state control and sovereignty over the essential
blueprint of how national government works and domestic affairs are
conducted.
The question of giving the EU a role in monitoring internal affairs cropped
up with prospect of enlargement to the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At
the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, when the ofﬁcial green light was
given to the eventual membership of countries in the former East, the
accession criteria were crafted to include, among other things, respect for
the rule of law, rights, and democracy.32 The European Commission was
tasked with monitoring the progress of the candidate countries toward fulﬁllment of these criteria, one of the prerequisites for becoming a Member State.
However, there was concern that even if the applicant states met the Copenhagen criteria before accession, afterwards, as post-Communist states with a
recent history of authoritarianism, they would be tempted to backtrack on
fundamental values. Therefore, with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the TEU
was amended to include the principles of the rule of law, rights, and
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democracy (Article 6) and a procedure for sanctioning Member States for “a
serious and persistent breach” of those principles (Article 7).33
What are now numbered Articles 2 and 7 of the TEU remain the EU’s main
policy tool for overseeing the rule of law, rights, and democracy at the national
level. Notwithstanding the many tweaks to the procedure that have been made
since 1997, it remains a weak policy instrument. The list of liberal democratic
principles, now called values, has gotten longer, but the values themselves
remain vague and undeﬁned: “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities.”34 As a result, the Council of Europe system
continues to operate as the primary reference point for the ﬂesh and bones of
the values and the EU institutions have relied heavily on European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law and Venice Commission opinions.35 Moreover, the Article 7 TEU procedure remains highly intergovernmental and the
determination of a “serious and persistent breach” is subject to unanimity
among the Member States (with the exception of the Member State being
sanctioned); even though Article 7 TEU has been formally triggered against
Poland, and now Hungary, the process has been excruciatingly slow and most
doubt that it will ever be brought to completion and sanctions imposed.36
Although EU powers over the rule of law, rights, and democracy are less
substantial than in any of the other policy areas covered in this volume, there
is evidence that here too spillover is pushing in the direction of greater
European integration. In this domain, the spillover comes from the administrative and judicial architecture essential to virtually every ﬁeld of EU law.
The EU has a very small administrative and judicial apparatus. For the most
part, it relies on the bureaucracies and judiciaries of the Member States to
implement EU law through a system known as integrated administration:
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National authorities implement the law on their territories in cooperation with
other national authorities and coordinated by EU-level authorities.37 As is
essential in rule-of-law systems, these national authorities are subject to the
jurisdiction of their national courts, which in turn participate in the EU court
system by making preliminary references on EU law to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ). In the single market days, the national authorities responsible
for implementation were mostly the bureaucratic actors responsible for regulating markets, under the supervision of their courts; now that the EU exercises competences in civil and criminal justice, these authorities are also
courts directly, which are responsible for deciding civil and criminal cases.
A certain degree of civil service independence from executive branch politics
has always been important for Member State administrative authorities to
faithfully perform their tasks under EU law, resist inevitable national biases,
and cooperate with their counterparts at the EU level and in the Member
States. For all of the obvious rule-of-law reasons, the independence of courts is
even more critical. It is because of the centrality of national courts, especially
in the implementation of EU criminal law, that it has been possible to mount
challenges before the ECJ against authoritarian moves to curb judicial
independence in Hungary and Poland, outside the throttled Article 7 TEU
framework, and inside the powerful judicial architecture of the TFEU.38
The emerging jurisprudence on independence of courts and, in some
cases, administrative actors has the potential to unravel the EU’s system of
integrated administration because, as a matter of law and not simply practice,39 Member State actors can refuse to cooperate with their counterparts in
other Member States if there are reasons to suspect their rule-of-law bona
ﬁdes. The most prominent illustration of this point comes from the libertyimpinging area of criminal law – the Celmer preliminary reference in which
the Irish court maintained that it did not have a duty to execute a European
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arrest warrant originating in Poland and return the suspect to Poland to face
trial.40 Even matters of less consequence for liberal rights can be affected by a
lack of trust in the independence and integrity of the cooperating authorities.
For instance, short-stay visas and long-term residence permits give foreign
nationals the right to travel anywhere within the Schengen Area;41 social
security certiﬁcates give the recipient the right to avoid paying into the social
security system of the host state where he or she is temporarily working (because
the certiﬁcate warrants that the worker is paying into the system of the home
state).42 If there are doubts as to the structural independence and operational
good faith of the issuing authorities, why should other Member States recognize
those visas, residence permits, and social security certiﬁcates as valid, along with
all the beneﬁts they confer within the single market and the Schengen Area? As
with the euro crisis, where the need to save the single currency spurred the
development of economic policy, the threat of unraveling policies that European political leaders are highly invested in, for instance the preservation of the
Schengen Area, might prompt more vigorous legislative action, such as making
access to European Structural and Investment Funds conditional on the
domestic rule of law.43 It goes without saying that these incentives are especially
strong for the ECJ, which bears direct responsibility for the EU’s implementation architecture, and which is coming under pressure to develop a role in
monitoring respect for liberal democratic values at the national level.
In the case of constitutional fundamentals, there is a two-way relationship
between EU law and populism. On the one hand, Article 7 TEU and the
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence are targeted directly at the authoritarian strand
of populism that seeks to take over liberal democratic institutions and undo
checks and balances in the name of “the people.”44 On the other hand, like
economic policy and human migration, the conﬂict generated by the EU’s
intervention plays to an important element of populism’s political base. In the
rhetoric of authoritarian populists, the genuine representatives of the people
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(themselves) are pitted against independent courts and supranational bodies,
which are cast as elite bodies that thwart the will of the people and that serve
other, external masters.45 Resisting the EU, and in particular the law of the
EU, is an important component of this ideology. There are many examples of
outright noncompliance with EU law. For instance, Hungary and Poland,
along with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, refused to take their refugee
quotas under the emergency EU relocation decisions adopted during the
height of the Syrian refugee crisis.46 The Polish government initially resisted
attempts to require Poland to comply with EU law on nature conservation and
continued logging notwithstanding an ECJ interim order.47 Article 7 TEU
and the European Court of Justice’s case law on judicial independence is yet
another arena for this populist–supranational conﬂict to play out, but an
extraordinarily visible one where the payoffs for authoritarian leaders are
potentially high.
In the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, the political leaders of
the original six Member States declared that they were “determined to lay the
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” This
historical discussion of the spillover process by which the EU has come to
exercise legal authority in classic areas of state sovereignty shows that Europe’s
founding fathers were actually quite prescient. At the same time, as also highlighted by the discussion, this law has been highly salient and has served as a
rallying cry for populist political forces, many of which directly oppose ever
closer union. This is the general state of affairs in sovereignty-sensitive domains.
It is now time to take each ﬁeld in turn and preview the individual contributions.

ii survey of the volume
The book’s consideration of the individual subjects begins with economic
policy and the legal and institutional landscape of post-crisis Eurozone governance. In Chapter 2, Matthias Ruffert brieﬂy narrates the historical development of EMU, with special attention to the role of constitutional courts, and
then turns to a presentation of the most salient reform proposals that have
been put forward by a variety of stakeholders. He unpacks the proposals by
45
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focusing on three elements that are common to virtually all of them: an
expanded budget for the Eurozone; more ﬂexible surveillance of national
budgetary discipline; and a revised institutional framework including, most
prominently, more parliamentary accountability. Ruffert argues that as a
matter of intergovernmental and party politics, and possibly also as a matter
of constitutional law, more budgetary spending will have to be coupled with a
robust commitment to ﬁscal stability if the proposals are to move forward.
With respect to parliamentary accountability, Ruffert takes the view that it is
largely satisﬁed through the ESM’s consensus rule for granting loans, since the
governments on the Board of Governors answer to their national parliaments.
In the future, however, as EMU governance becomes more politically driven,
he argues that accountability to the European Parliament may have to be
enhanced; at the same time, the constitutional framework should be ﬂexible,
to allow for political debate and change.
Chapter 3 turns speciﬁcally to the ﬁscal and economic surveillance aspect
of EMU governance. As Philomila Tsoukala explains, in the course of the
European Semester, the European Commission reviews the budgetary and
economic policies of the Member States and formulates country-speciﬁc
recommendations (CSRs) designed to improve growth and ﬁscal stability.
Based on its experience in administering conditionality in country bailouts,
the Commission has developed CSRs into a far-reaching set of structural
reforms and best practices for public administration and labor, welfare, tax,
and social security policy. There can be powerful incentives to adopt the
recommended reforms, especially for Member States at risk of being sanctioned under the corrective limb of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. As analyzed by Tsoukala, CSRs are largely aimed at liberalizing markets
and creating export-based economies. Although some commentators have
argued that the recent inclusion of social indicators for evaluating national
economic policy represents a change of direction, Tsoukala is skeptical. She
argues that EMU’s continued emphasis on budgetary discipline and the low
capacity for redistribution in the Eurozone will most likely produce pressure
to converge on a minimalist version of the welfare state – ﬂexible labor
markets and welfare for the neediest. Overall, Tsoukala questions the legitimacy of CSRs given that the European Commission is a technocratic body cut
off from genuine democratic debate.
Nicolas Jabko, in Chapter 4, takes a step back from the speciﬁcs of economic governance and situates the post-2008 developments in the political
science literature on European integration and international relations. He asks
the question of why, contrary to general expectations, the politically charged
issue of bailouts, with their highly visible consequences for state sovereignty,
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gave way to more European integration rather than disintegration. The
answer, Jabko argues, requires a more ﬂuid concept of sovereignty than is
generally presumed in political science theories. In Jabko’s theoretical
account, European political leaders responded to the ﬂaws in EMU revealed
by the euro crisis by searching for solutions that were both transformational
and that took on board sovereignty concerns. They proposed greater solidarity
through loans, but at the same time only as a “last resort” to preserve the
Eurozone; they required considerable discipline of recipient countries, but
framed as a temporary, quid pro quo for loan ﬁnancing. European leaders built
political coalitions in support of these new sovereignty practices – both at the
international level and among their domestic electorates. The last step, in this
account, was to progressively institutionalize the new sovereignty practices in
EU economic governance.
Before the sovereign debt crisis, there was the banking crisis, and Chapter 5
by Elliot Posner analyzes its impact on EU ﬁnancial regulation. Since ﬁnancial regulation is one of the most globalized of all policy areas, Posner
considers both its internal and the external dimensions. He demonstrates that
the integration of European ﬁnancial markets that occurred in the 1990s
rested on an internal political bargain that gave a central role to the United
Kingdom, the region’s leading ﬁnancial center, and on a regulatory harmonization strategy that drew from the (often neoliberal) standards of transnational
regulatory bodies, widely seen as technocratic and neutral. This both accelerated integration internally and elevated the EU externally, making it an
important player in global standard-setting. After the crisis, the internal political bargain suffered: the EU ratcheted up regulation through Banking Union
and other reforms and, in the process, London was often isolated or part of the
losing coalition. Posner argues that these internal divisions have, in combination with other factors, diminished the EU’s international bargaining heft.
The likely upshot, especially in view of Brexit, is a London–New York alliance
in transnational standard-setting bodies that will set the regulatory terms for
global ﬁnancial markets and that will sideline the EU.
The part on economic policy concludes with Renaud Dehousse’s analysis
of the impact of the euro crisis on the wider European political system. In
Chapter 6, he uncovers two important trends. On the one hand, the response
of European leaders to the euro crisis was to seek to depoliticize macroeconomic policy, by empowering the European Commission in the surveillance
procedure and by giving the ECB authority over the banking system. On the
other hand, politicization has been occurring at both the national and the EU
levels. Largely because of austerity, domestic political parties have come to
mobilize around EU issues, either rejecting the idea of integration entirely or
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opposing speciﬁc EU policies. At the same time, at the EU level, there is a
trend toward parliamentary government and an effort to enhance the importance of European elections, with the development of the so-called
Spitzenkandidaten system: in elections for the European Parliament, European political parties each select a candidate for president of the European
Commission, and the candidate of the winning party or coalition of parties
becomes president. This resembles the conﬁdence relationship between parliament and government in a domestic parliamentary system and has contributed to a more political role for the Commission president. (This system,
however, is still in ﬂux, as demonstrated by the recent elections for the
2019–2024 European Parliament, which led to the appointment of a Spitzenkandidaten outsider as Commission president.) Dehousse demonstrates that
there are fundamental contradictions between the de-politicized “trusteeship”
model and the parliamentary government model, evident for instance in the
Commission’s ambiguous role in enforcing the Eurozone budget-deﬁcit
targets. Dehousse argues that these contradictions will have to be addressed,
although he underscores that this will be difﬁcult in the current environment
of widespread opposition to Brussels and growing polarization among the
Member States.
The book then moves to human migration. Chapter 7, by Ulf Öberg and
Nathalie Leyns, focuses on intra-EU migration and the historical evolution of
the law of free movement of persons. They argue that through to the 1990s, the
principle of non-discrimination in the context of free movement of workers
(for long-term employment) and services (for short-term labor movements)
was interpreted as protecting both foreign and domestic workers: On the one
hand, Member State nationals were guaranteed access to employment in
other Member States but at the same time, through the application of the
principle of equality and equal pay for equal work, the nationals of host
Member States were guaranteed that their wages and working conditions
would not be undercut. This was largely also the case for the ECJ’s interpretation of the Posting of Workers Directive, which was adopted in 1996 and
which was designed to facilitate the cross-border provision of services and
ensure a minimum level of social protection for posted workers. However, in
their account, the Court’s approach changed after the 2004 accession: in the
Laval, Ruffert, and Viking line of cases, what had previously been viewed as
legitimate social demands for non-discrimination in line with the labor law
principle of lex loci laboris came to be seen as xenophobic and protectionist,
and the minimum labor standards contained in the Directive were interpreted
as a ceiling that prevented the imposition of higher standards, such as average
pay rates. This jurisprudence, together with other developments, has
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generated political backlash, and Öberg and Leyns trace a number of EU
legislative and jurisprudential developments favorable to labor and social
rights that lead them to be optimistic about the future prospects of EU
democracy.
In Chapter 8, Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi turns to migration from outside
the EU, and one of the most developed and salient areas of EU policy
involving third-country nationals – the Common European Asylum System.
After exploring the foundational legal principles that govern in this area,
Tsourdi focuses on the administrative component, which she argues is underdeveloped and bears a large part of the blame for the mishandling of the
2015–2016 refugee crisis. She identiﬁes three key elements of asylum implementation – the Dublin System of assigning responsibility for asylum seekers
to the Member State of ﬁrst irregular entry; practical cooperation among
national authorities under the umbrella of an EU agency (EASO); and EU
funding. Tsourdi argues that on each dimension there has been change,
driven by attempts at fairer burden-sharing in the asylum system – relocation
of asylum applicants from the state of ﬁrst entry to other Member States, a
greater role for EASO in managing migration hotspots, and more EU funding.
In Chapter 9, Niovi Vavoula tackles the proliferation of EU databases on
third-country nationals. Vavoula traces three waves of databases: (1) those
connected with the early Schengen and Dublin Conventions (SIS and Eurodac); (2) those fueled by the tendency post-9/11 to view immigration as a
potential security risk, including the database for short-stay visa applicants
(VIS), the second-generation SIS (SIS II), and the revamped Eurodac; (3)
those prompted by the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016,
including two databases designed to cover visa-free travelers (EES and ETIAS)
and legislation designed to make all of the existing databases interoperable.
The chapter then conducts an evaluation of the databases from the perspective
of personal data protection and privacy. Among the numerous concerns, one
of the most basic is how travel and the everyday exercise of personal freedoms
by third-country nationals are viewed as inherently suspicious and operate as a
trigger for state surveillance.
The next part of the book covers internal security, i.e. police and judicial
cooperation. In light of the highly salient Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks of
2015 and 2016, this section opens with internal security policy focused specifically on counter-terrorism. In Chapter 10, Gilles de Kerchove and Christiane
Höhn give essential background on the historical evolution, legal framework,
and institutional architecture for EU counter-terrorism policy. As they explain,
the EU’s competences in the ﬁeld are signiﬁcant, but they are largely centered
on law enforcement cooperation, and exclude cooperation between

Introduction: EU Law, Sovereignty, and Populism

25

(domestic) security services and (foreign) intelligence services. These fall
under the umbrella of “national security” and remain the sole responsibility
of the Member States. The chapter then analyzes in depth one of the most
important elements of EU counter-terrorism strategy – the use of information
and EU databases to detect planned terrorist attacks and apprehend suspected
terrorists.
Valsamis Mitsilegas follows with a critical perspective on some of the
policy developments in the counter-terrorism ﬁeld, as well as internal security more generally. In Chapter 11, he argues that the blurring of the boundaries between police and criminal law and other areas of law has led to a
general shift from the classic repressive model of state coercive action to
a paradigm of preventive justice. One of the key elements of this shift has
been the mobilization of data collected for a variety of purposes – as
described in the previous two chapters of the book – to prevent future
criminal acts. Another aspect has been the use of external affairs competences to target internal security risks. In light of the implications of the
preventive paradigm for the rule of law and fundamental rights, Mitsilegas
argues that the EU should drop the “security crisis” mentality that has
produced the preventive paradigm and should adopt a more reﬂective
approach, aimed at managing security within a solid framework of human
rights and the rule of law.
As de Kerchove and Höhn underscore, EU–US cooperation on counterterrorism and combating other types of serious crime is essential. In Chapter 12,
the book turns to a recent effort to bolster law enforcement investigations that
has an important transatlantic dimension – the CLOUD Act in the United
States and the e-Evidence proposals in the EU. As Jennifer Daskal explains,
the rise of a globally connected Internet and cloud storage have led to everincreasing amounts of digital evidence being held by private service providers
located outside the territory of the investigating nation. The traditional mutual
legal assistance process, which requires the use of ofﬁcial inter-state channels
to obtain the evidence, has proven cumbersome in this new context. In
response, the United States has recently enacted the CLOUD Act, which
clariﬁes that US warrant authority reaches all data under the control of US
service providers, without regard to the location of the data; the EU has
proposed legislation that would allow Member State authorities to directly
compel the production of stored data held by service providers located in
another Member State. Daskal assesses the potential for international cooperation under these legislative schemes and argues that they represent an
important ﬁrst step in addressing the problem of evidence gathering in the
contemporary, globalized data environment.
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Chapter 13, by Marc Rotenberg and Eleni Kyriakides, considers the role of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in safeguarding fundamental rights. As explained earlier in this introduction, the Council of Europe
system, including the ECHR and the ECtHR, has traditionally had primary
responsibility for overseeing Member State respect for liberal democratic
rights, rights which come under great pressure when states respond to international terrorism. Rotenberg and Kyriakides describe how France used
Article 15 ECHR (“Derogation in Time of Emergency”) to derogate from
important Article 8 ECHR privacy rights in the aftermath of the Paris terrorist
attacks; Turkey did the same after the failed coup attempt in the summer of
2016. They argue that neither France nor Turkey satisﬁed the requirements for
derogations under the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, and they propose new institutional mechanisms that would give NGOs an important role in identifying
and publicizing excessive derogations from Article 8 rights.
As explained in the spillover section of this introduction, border control,
immigration, and internal security policy have common political and legal
origins and today are all part of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice
(AFSJ). In Chapter 14, Emilio De Capitani concludes this part of the book
with a holistic analysis of recent developments in the AFSJ. After analyzing
the full range of legal innovations that were introduced in the Lisbon Treaty,
he canvasses the legislative track record in the AFSJ. He points to a number
of signiﬁcant ﬂaws with how the Lisbon governance model has worked in
practice, in particular from the perspective of the European Parliament.
These include the failure of national police authorities to communicate
the statistics and data necessary for good policymaking; and the empowerment of EU agencies at the expense of the Commission and Parliament. The
chapter ends with a list of pragmatic recommendations for the 2019–2024
legislature.
Moving to constitutional fundamentals, the book takes up the problem of
democratic backsliding in the Member States and the response in EU law.
Chapter 15 by Kim Lane Scheppele and R. Daniel Kelemen gives the
historical and legal background of Articles 2 and 7 TEU and explains why
partisan politics in a multi-level, federal-type system like the EU make it
unlikely that Article 7 will ever be deployed against Hungary, Poland, or other
cases of democratic backsliding. The chapter puts forward a series of more
promising legal alternatives for enforcing liberal democratic values: systemic
infringement actions under Article 258 TFEU; suspension of payments of
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) to Hungary and Poland
under the existing ESIF rules requiring effective judicial oversight in recipient
countries; and allowing courts of one Member State to stop cooperating with
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courts of another Member State under EU criminal and civil justice schemes
based on a legitimate concern for judicial independence in that
Member State.
In Chapter 16, Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz shifts our attention speciﬁcally
to Poland. He explores the role of resentment – anxiety about the “other,”
anger at the liberal establishment, fear of exclusion – in driving the current
illiberal turn and a switch in constitutional doctrine from rule of law to rule by
law. The chapter then analyzes how the politics of resentment has played out
on the EU stage with the Białowieża Forest case. Brought in 2017, this was an
infringement action against Poland for logging in the ancient Białowieża
Forest in violation of EU nature conservation directives. On the one hand,
the case vindicated the rule of law, as it resulted in two interim orders and a
judgment against Poland, as well as a novel legal doctrine of periodic penalty
payments being available for noncompliance with interim measures. On the
other hand, Koncewicz argues that the ultimate result was disappointing,
since the Commission lacked the political resolve to apply the periodic
penalty payments against Poland.
Chapter 17 offers a complementary diagnosis of authoritarian populism in
Poland and Hungary. Bojan Bugarič argues that populism in general, and the
illiberal variety in Poland and Hungary in particular, can be explained in large
part by austerity and the neoliberal structural reforms of the past decades. After
considering the legal and economic sanctions in the EU toolkit and explaining why they are unlikely to work, the chapter focuses on economic and social
policies. Bugarič argues that populist leaders have built their following by
promising better material conditions and that European political leaders
should counter by articulating an alternative to austerity and offering progressive economic policies that promote growth, better jobs, high-quality social
services, and high environmental standards.
The last chapter in this part rounds out the discussion of constitutional
fundamentals by shining the spotlight on EU governance and the perennial
problem of the democratic deﬁcit. In Chapter 18, Peter L. Lindseth argues
that even as extensive regulatory power has been delegated to supranational
EU institutions, the experience of legitimate, democratic self-government
has remained stubbornly national. This is a historical-sociological problem,
not one of institutional architecture as suggested by the term “democratic
deﬁcit,” and therefore Lindseth calls it the “democratic disconnect.” The
democratic disconnect is used as an analytical frame for understanding the
developments in economic policy, migration, and internal security over
the past decade: in all of these areas, the EU has been called upon to do
more, but it has relied almost exclusively on autonomous national ﬁscal and

28

Francesca Bignami

human capacity to do so, since only the state has the legitimacy and hence
the power to mobilize resources. Looking forward, Lindseth argues that even
as the ECJ takes on a more important role in monitoring constitutional
fundamentals at the national level, as advocated by Scheppele, Kelemen,
and Koncewicz, it should avoid erecting a quasi-federalist constitution for
the EU that is out of sync with the sociological experience of democratic
self-government.

iii assessing the overall legal architecture of
sovereignty-sensitive domains
The book’s concluding chapter takes stock of the policy areas covered in the
volume and brings to light three important legal and normative challenges
that cut across all of them. As discussed earlier, it is commonplace that the
rule of law, rights, and democracy are the bedrock of the European constitutional tradition. Like Member State law, EU law is expected to abide by
these elements of the European constitutional tradition, and the concluding
chapter assesses how it measures up. By tracing the development of EU law in
sovereignty-sensitive areas, both the formal legal powers and how those powers
have been used over the past decade, the concluding chapter reveals a
number of common characteristics and shortcomings on the three dimensions. At the same time, by understanding the shortcomings, it is possible to
make proposals for advancing the rule of law, rights, and democracy across the
spectrum of policy areas.
First, the rule of law: As chronicled earlier, the EU has come to exercise
powers over economic policy, human migration, internal security, and constitutional fundamentals not by grand design but through spillover, and in
seeking to accommodate sovereignty concerns, European leaders have constructed a highly complex legal order. To govern in these controversial areas,
they have used two very different types of legal norms, what I call international
and supranational, and over time the norms in the international category have
migrated into the supranational category. This process of migration, in turn,
has generated confusion, undermining what in legal scholarship and doctrine
is referred to as legal certainty. Variety in the type of norm and change in the
status of the norms over time, have generated extreme legal complexity and
have undermined the knowability of law – a central element of the rule of law.
The chapter argues that legal simpliﬁcation can be advanced by integrating
economic and internal security law into the core TFEU and, within the
TFEU, by limiting the doctrine of direct effect as a pre-condition for domestic
litigation based on EU law.
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Second, with respect to rights, the concluding chapter highlights the inadequacies of access to justice and the procedure for testing EU law. The
preliminary reference system is the primary vehicle by which EU citizens
can challenge the validity of EU law based on the higher law of fundamental
rights.48 In sovereignty-sensitive areas, however, it is more difﬁcult to use the
system, since Member States tend to retain considerable discretion in implementing EU legislation, which for a variety of reasons complicates making the
validity claim in the preliminary reference procedure. At the same time, it is
more important to get cases heard in areas such as economic policy, immigration, and internal security. There, unlike single market regulation where the
economic rights of relatively sophisticated market actors are at stake, the
fundamental rights of ordinary citizens come under pressure – the civil,
political, and social rights that are central to the liberal and social democratic
identity kit. Because of these deﬁciencies, the chapter takes up two proposals
that would expand direct access for individuals to the European Court of
Justice.
The third and ﬁnal element of the European constitutional tradition
considered in the concluding chapter is democracy, taking the institutional
template contained in the Lisbon Treaty as the baseline. Lawmaking across
the different policy areas, even those like immigration and internal security
which are now formally governed through the supranational Community
method, has tended to veer toward intergovernmentalism because of their
sovereignty stakes. Intergovernmentalism is a process in which the asymmetric
interdependence and bargaining power of states determine outcomes and
democratic politics operate between domestic electorates and their political
leaders. It is a political fact. Intergovernmental politics, however, both at the
European and the domestic levels, avoid the moral dilemmas of Europe-wide
governance and short circuit the construction of a Europe-wide identity.
Therefore, this chapter argues for greater accountability to the European
Parliament, even though decisional powers for the Parliament might not yet
be politically feasible. Although the European Parliament undoubtedly has its
ﬂaws, which the chapter discusses, it is the one forum where Europe-wide
debates and politics can be conducted and it offers an important arena for
developing a European perspective on sovereignty-sensitive policy areas.
Independently, when seen in isolation from the perspective of any of the
legal sub-ﬁelds, the problems of legal complexity, access to justice, and retreat
48

For a general description of the preliminary reference system, see Court of Justice of the
European Union, Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals, in Relation to the
Initiation of Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, 2016 O.J. (C 439) 1.
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to intergovernmentalism may not be perceived as particularly grave. Lawyers,
with enough training, can always decipher the complexities of their ﬁelds of
specialization; there are alternatives to the ECJ for assessing fundamental
rights compliance in the various policy areas; intergovernmentalism can
produce the action necessary for successful policy outputs. However, when
these shortcomings exist across the entire gamut, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that they compromise the legal system as a whole and that they
can and should be addressed through common forms of legal innovation.
These are the cross-cutting theoretical and normative lessons that I draw in my
conclusion to this volume. But before delving further into these general
lessons, it is time now to turn to the details of how law and governance have
evolved in each of the policy domains.

